Rethinking Security Measures for PoW Blockchains
The recent spate of 51% attacks on Ethereum Classic (ETC) has blogged the blockchain world into a frenzy, illuminating the underlying vulnerabilities present in proof-of-work (PoW) networks. In less than a month, ETC faced three separate incursions, with attackers wielding rented hashrate power. The most shocking of these attacks? A $5.6 million loss for OKEx, a prominent cryptocurrency exchange, which promptly compensated its users. Not too surprisingly, the exchange has since voiced intentions to delist ETC unless substantial security enhancements are made.
Is the Vulnerability Exclusive to Ethereum Classic?
As the dust settles from the drama surrounding ETC, a crucial question arises: Are these vulnerabilities unique to Ethereum Classic’s ecosystem, or do they permeate all PoW structures? The simple answer is – it’s complicated. Emin Gün Sirer, a prominent figure in the crypto space, notes that any PoW coin lacking enough hash power is at risk. “Their security crucially relies on the amount of hashrate that attackers can amass,” he points out. So, if you thought only ETC had problems, think again; it seems the whole clan of PoW blockchains could be on thin ice.
The Role of Hasrate Rental Firms
Among the various players coiled in this saga are hashrate rental firms, which some believe exacerbate the chances of attack. The problem, as the MIT research team suggests, is simple: these platforms allow malicious actors to easily obtain the required power to conduct an attack. The team has proposed that effective regulation of these rental firms might help. But hold on—Darren Tapp, an assistant research professor, argues that most rental firms operate in jurisdictions far removed from regulatory oversight, rendering any attempt to curb them nearly futile.
The MIT Team’s Game Theory Approach
One fascinating avenue of research that emerged comes from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which proposed leveraging game theory to combat potential attacks. Drawing inspiration from the “war of attrition” theory, researchers suggest that hackers could be disincentivized by the threat of retaliation. Daniel Aronoff, co-author of the study, proposes that a deep-pocketed exchange could threaten attackers with counterattacks, ideally deterring them from executing double-spend maneuvers.
Checkpointing: A Band-Aid or a Viable Solution?
In September, the proposal of utilizing checkpoints from networks like Cardano to overthrow 51% attacks was tossed about. But let’s be real—this idea has its critics. Sirer argues that sewing this kind of proposal into a decentralized fabric is inherently risky, as it challenges the bedrock principle of blockchain’s autonomy. On the flip side, some, like Jay Hao from OKEx, believe it could serve as a last-resort safety net. But can smart folks working together to validate the network be trusted? Or are we just inviting more trouble?
The Future of Ethereum Classic and PoW
While the ETC community furrows its brow over potential solutions, the hard truth remains: for now, many PoW blockchains may continue to wobble as long as hash power can be rented without checks. Learnings from these recent attacks underscore a critical point that transcends ETC: maintaining robustness against 51% attacks requires diligence, strategic innovations, and perhaps a little less faith in the decentralized spirit that brought blockchain to the forefront.
+ There are no comments
Add yours